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CoLLaborative FamiLy Law and
Gender Inequalities: Balancing
Risks and Opportunities
WANDAWIEGERS* & MICHAELA KEET**
Collaborative Law (CL] is a unique settlement process increasingly used by family lawyers.
In this article, the authors examine the potential of CL to alleviate the impact of gendered
differences in bargaining power between family clients. Proponents suggest that the more
extensive involvement of lawyers in the CL process can prove more effective in dealing with
vulnerable clients than either litigation or family mediation in their current forms. Drawing
on the available literature on CL, their own empirical research, and the extensive literature
on gender imbalances in mediation, the authors examine the likely impact of both the back-
ground norms and unique structural features of CL on the experience of female clients.
They argue that CL's potential impact will depend largely on how sensitive lawyers are to
the existence of gendered power imbalances, on whether they screen effectively, provide
timely and specific legal advice, and work at more effective communication with their clients.
Serious concerns are raised regarding the use of the standard clause disqualifying lawyers
from acting in subsequent litigation. These concerns heighten the importance of adequate
screening into the process.
Le droit familial collaboratif (DFCJ est un processus particulier de r~glement auquel les
avocats sp6cialis6 s en droit de [a famille recourent de plus en plus souvent. Dans cet arti-
cle, les auteurs analysent le potentiel que pr6sente le DFC de r6duire l'impact des
diff6rences lies au sexe sur le plan du pouvoir de n6gociation entre les familles clientes.
Pour les partisans, lorsque 'on s'occupe de clients vuln6rables, Ia participation plus 6ten-
due des avocats au prmcessus OFG peut se r~v4ler plus efficace que le contentieux ou (a
m6diation familiale dans leurs formes actuelles. Partant de [a documentation disponible
concernant le DFC, de leur propre recherche empirique, ainsi que de l'abondante docu-
mentation qui traite des d6s6quilibres li6s au sexe pendant les m6diations, les auteurs
examinent ['impact vraisemblable qu'exercent les normes contextuelles et les aspects
structurels particuliers du DFC sur l'exp6rience des clientes. Its avancent que ['impact
potentiel du DFC d6pendra grandement de plusieurs facteurs : [a sensibilit6 des avocats A
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['existence de d6s6quilibres li6s au sexe, s'its examinent efficacement les cas, s'its four-
nissent des conseils juridiques opportuns et sp6cifiques, et s'its s'efforcent d'6tablir une
communication plus efficace avec leurs clients. Les auteurs soul6vent des doutes s6rieux
concernant ['usage de [a clause standard qui interdit aux avocats d'intervenir au cours du
contentieux ult6rieur. Ces doutes mettent en relief ['importance d'un examen ad6quat des
cas avant ['entree dans le processus.
L EVIDENCE OF OUTCOMES AND BACKGROUND NORMS ............................................................... 741
II. STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF COLLABORATIVE LAW ..................................................................... 748
A. Entrenchm ent of Lawyers into the Process ..................................................................... 748
1. Screening for Power Im balances and Abuse .................................................... 749
2. Am biguity over the Influence of Legal Norms ................................................... 756
3. Traditional Advocacy and Em otionalSupport .................................................... 758
B. Disclosure, Good Faith Bargaining, and Limits on Communication ................................ 759
C . D isqualification P rovision (D P ) ......................................................................................... 763
III. C O N C L U S IO N.................................................................................................................................. 7 7 0
THE VAST MAJORITY OF FAMILY LAW DISPUTES in Canada are settled rather than
adjudicated.' Restricted legal aid coverage, high litigation costs, and mounting
institutional pressures2 combine to render settlement the most viable option for
most family law clients.3 In negotiating these settlements, the stakes are high since
agreements negotiated with legal counsel are difficult to overturn and are likely
to affect clients in profound ways long into the future.' Against this backdrop,
lawyers and clients continue to search for more effective ways to enhance the
settlement process. Dissatisfied with both litigation and mediation, many law-
yers have recently turned to Collaborative Law (CL) as their process of choice.5
1. Only four per cent of family law disputes in Canada end in contested adjudication. See
Julien D. Payne & Marilyn A. Payne, Canadian Family Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2006) at 137, 143.
2. Lawyers are legally obligated to advise their dients of the possibility of mediation. See e.g
Divorce Act, RS.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 3, s. 9(2); The Children's LawAct, 1997, S.S. 1997,
c. C-8.2, s. 11 (1) (b). Additionally, pilot mandatory parent education courses strongly en-
courage settlement for the sake of the children, and judges have been empowered to order
mediation. See e.g The Children's Law Act, 1997, s. 10; The Family Maintenance Act, 1997,
S.S. 1997, c. F-6.2, s. 15(1). Pre-trial conferences provide a final pressure point for settlement
3. See Lisa Addario, Getting a Foot in the Door: Women, LegalAid andAccess to Justice (Ottawa
Status of Women Canada, 1998).
4. See Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550; Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303.
5. For analysis on the emergence of CL, see Julie Macfarlane, "Experiences of Collaborative
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In this article, we examine whether and how the distinctive features of CL
affect the impact and salience of gender inequalities in the negotiation of family
law disputes. First developed by lawyers in the United States, the emergence of
CL has been described as a "paradigm shift" in legal practice.6 One of the key
distinguishing features of CL is the role lawyers play in the settlement process.
CL seeks to realize the benefits of client participation and interest-based nego-
tiation through the active involvement of lawyers as both facilitators and
advocates. Unlike in traditional negotiation or litigation, CL lawyers commit to
a set of transparent values that emphasizes the importance of the emotional and
participatory needs of their clients, the possibility of creative outcomes, and the
interdependence of the parties! In another departure from most settlement
processes, CL requires that both lawyers and clients work together in open four-
way sessions toward the resolution of their dispute.
The CL process is also typically structured according to rules of engage-
ment and disengagement that are set out in agreements entered into by both
clients and their lawyers. The content of these agreements varies between prov-
inces and/or regions, but generally these agreements require open disclosure of
all material information within the four-way session and demand that lawyers
cease representing their clients if the process fails to generate a settlement. To
date, the CL process, in both Canada and the United States, has been restricted
largely to the family law area.8
Law: Preliminary Results from the Collaborative Lawyering Research Project" (2004) 1 J.
Disp. Resol. 179 [Macfarlane, "Experiences"]; Department of Justice, The Emerging
Phenomenon of Collaborative Family Law (CFL): A Qualitative Study of CFL Cases by Julie
Macfarlane (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 2005), online:
<http://www.justice.gc.calengtpi/pad-rpadlrep-rap/2
0 0 5 1/2005-l.pdf> [Macfarlane,
Emerging Phenomenon]; William H. Schwab, "Collaborative Lawyering A Closer Look at an
Emerging Practice" (2004) 4 Pepp. Disp. Rsol. LI. 351; B d Hunter, "The Future of
Collaborative Law" [on file with the authors] [Hunter, "Future"]; and John Lande,
"Possibilities for Collaborative Law- Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and
Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering" (2003) 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1315.
6. Richard W. Shields, Judith P. Ryan & Victoria L. Smith, Collaborative Family Law: Another
Way to Resolve Family Disputes (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2003) at 27.
7. For a review of the CL process model, see ibid. See also Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law:
Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation (Chicago: American Bar Associa-
tion, 2001); Barbara Landau, Lorne Wolfson & Niki Landau, Family Mediation &
Collaborative Practice Handbook, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2005).
8. Lande, supra note 5 at 1380, 1317, n. 3.
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The impact of CL on gendered inequalities in bargaining power in family
disputes has, as of yet, been largely unexplored. In an earlier article, we docu-
mented the results of a small-scale qualitative study that examined the
experience of eight clients and twelve lawyers in CL.' We explored variables
affecting client engagement inside the process and identified gendered power
imbalances as one factor that led to varying, and often problematic, results.
Given the small sample size of this study, our results could not be generalized to
the client population at large. In the present article, we undertake a more com-
prehensive analysis of CL's potential to alleviate gendered differences in
bargaining power between family law clients. We focus specifically on gender
inequalities and draw to a greater extent on our lawyer interviews" to shed fur-
ther light on the role of the lawyer in CL and on the effect of various
procedural norms or constraints unique to the CL process. We also draw more
broadly on the academic literature in the dispute resolution field, to the extent
that this literature provides a critical lens into the potential risks and dangers of
CL for the client population as a whole.
The results of our qualitative study are consistent with established correla-
tions between gender inequalities and well-recognized sources of unequal
bargaining power in the context of separation. 1 Much higher rates of spousal
abuse have been reported in past or previous relationships than in subsisting
ones.1 2 In intimate relationships generally, women are more likely than men to
9. See Michaela Keet, Wanda Wiegers & Melanie Morrison, "Client Engagement Inside Col-
laborative Law" (2008) 24 Can. J. Fam. L 145.
10. We informed all lawyer members of the Association of Collaborative Lawyers of Saskatche-
wan of our study and then randomly approached members, ensuring equal representation of
male and female lawyers from both urban and non-urban practices. We developed interview
guidelines based on two interviews with key informants involved in CL in the province. See
ibiat, where the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) approach that was used to
conduct, transcribe, and analyze in-depth telephone interviews is oudined. The following
codes are used to identify the transcripts of interviewees: UM1-3 (urban males 1 to 3); UF1-
3 (urban females 1 to 3); RM1-3 (rural males 1 to 3); and RF1-3 (rural females 1 to 3).
11. See e.g. Robert H. Mnookin, "Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering" in John
M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz, eds., The Resolution of Family Conflict Comparative Legal
Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1984) 364 at 367-76.
12. See Maggie Charmant etaL, "Women and the Criminal Justice System" in Statistics Canada,
Women in Canada 2005: A Gender-Based Statistical Report, 5th ed. (Ottawa: Ministry of
Industry, 2006) 159 at 160, 165 [Women in Canada]. Estimates of domestic violence in
some studies of couples mandated to attend mediation in the United States are as high as 80
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experience repeated incidents and more serious forms of physical violence 1-
including a higher risk of lethal violence after separation 14-and are more likely
to confront a climate of coercive control."5
Women's disproportionate responsibility for childcare 6 and lower earning
potential also function as sources of power imbalance. Women are more likely
to have both a stronger preference for custody and a greater need for support
than men. Economically, women are more likely than men to have lower and
often untested earning power 7 and less access to income-generating assets of
the marriage. They may also have less accurate information regarding assets and
future earning potential, and be more concerned about the cost of prolonged
negotiation and litigation."8
per cent of all separating couples. Jennifer P. Maxwell, "Mandatory Mediation of Custody in
the Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators" (1999) 37 Fam. Ct.
Rev. 335 at 337.
13. Karen Mihorean, "Trends in Self-reported Spousal Violence" in Statistics Canada, Family
Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 2005 by Kathy AuCoin, ed. (Ottawx Ministry of
Industry, 2005) 13 at 15-17; Melanie Kowalski, "Spousal Homicides" in Statistics Canada,
Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 2006by Lucie Ogrodnik, ed. (Ottawa
Ministry of Industry, 2006) 52.
14. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, "Spousal Homicide" in Statistics Canada, Juristat, vol. 14,
no. 8 (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 1994). In the 2004 General Social Survey, 34 per cent
of all women who acknowledged incidents of violence during their relationships reported an
increase in the severity or frequency of violence after separation. Mihorean, ibid. at 16.
15. M.P. Johnson & J.M. Leone, "The Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational
Couple Violence: Findings from the National Violence against Women Survey" (2005) 26 J.
Fam. Issues 322 at 325; Evan Stark, "Commentary on Johnson's 'Conflict and Control:
Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence'" (2006) 12 Violence Against
Women 1019.
16. Katherine Marshall notes that time spent on childcare by fathers with children under nineteen
years of age has increased on average since 1986, but it has increased more for mothers (from
1.4 to 2 hours per day) than for fathers (from 0.6 to 1 hour per day) as of 2005. Marshall also
indicates that women account for 89 per cent of stay-at-home parents. See Katherine Marshall,
"Converging Gender Roles" in Statistics Canada, Perspectives on Labour and Income, vol. 7,
no. 7 (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2006) 5 at 11. Women part-time workers, as well as
women in dual-earner families, are likely to miss more days of paid work for family reasons than
men. See Colin Lindsay & Marcia Almey, "Paid and Unpaid Work" in Women in Canada,
supra note 12, 103 at 109-10.
17. Women are still paid less than men on average and remain concentrated in traditional female-
dominated fields of employment. See Lindsay & Almey, ibid at 113; Colin Lindsay &
Marcia Almey, "Income and Earnings" in Women in Canada, supra note 12, 133 at 133, 139.
18. For studies in other jurisdictions, see Howard S. Erlanger, Elizabeth Chambliss & Marygold
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Gender role socialization further suggests that women might perceive
themselves, or be perceived by others, as having less credibility or status in as-
serting their needs or interests, 19 might tend to prefer cooperation to conflict or
strategic negotiation, and might compromise their claims to obtain better in-
terpersonal relations in the longer run. 2' Finally, men are more likely than
women to benefit from the difficulty of reliably predicting or quantifying legal
entitlements in the area of family or divorce law.21 These sources of power im-
balance can render women in heterosexual relationships particularly vulnerable
to settlement pressures and may not be fully offset or muted by other individu-
alized variables.22
S. Melli, "Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce
Context" (1987) 21 Law & Soc'y Rev. 585. Erlanger, Chambliss, and Melli find that most
of the informal settlements in the twenty-five US divorce cases they examined were the
product of threats, intimidation, unequal financial resources, emotional fatigue, or external
pressure imposed by both judges and lawyers. "The observation that informal processes
mirror preexisting power relations between the disputants is highly relevant; in some cases
informal settlement simply structures the capitulation of the weaker party" (at 603). For an
extensive study of over fifty family law cases in the United Kingdom, see Gwynn Davis,
Stephen Cretney & Jean Collins, Simple Quarrel Negotiations andAdjudication in Divorce
(New York. Oxford University Press, 1994).
19. Psychological research shows that women are likely to achieve less favourable outcomes in
negotiations for reasons that indude gendered expectations, implicit stereotype threats, and
different measures of personal entitlement See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small,
"Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining" (2008)
26 Law & Inequality 109 at 116-20, 125-26.
20. Ibid, at 115-16. A review of empirical studies suggests that the association between women
and a co-operative negotiating style is probably not inherent but rather reflects differences in
power and status. See Carol Watson, "Gender Differences in Negotiating Behavior and
Outcomes: Fact or Artifact?" in Anita Taylor & Judi Bernstein Miller, eds., Conflict and
Gender (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 1994) 191 at 203, 206. See also Loraleigh Keashly,
"Gender and Conflict: What Does Psychological Research Tell Us?" in Conflict and Gender,
167 at 176. For discussion on the impact of gender differences in salary and wage negotiations,
see Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, "Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome:
A Meta-Analysis" (1999) 52 Personnel Psyc. 653; Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women
Don'tAskta Negotiation and the Gender Divide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
21. Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 19 at 121-28. Applying negotiation theory, Craig
Martin argues that daimants are disadvantaged because of legal indeterminacy in relation to
spousal support. See Craig Martin, "Unequal Shadows: Negotiation Theory and Spousal
Support Under Canadian Divorce Law" (1998) 56 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 135.
22. See Desmond Ellis & Laurie Wight, "Theorizing Power in Divorce Negotiations: Implica-
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There are inevitable limits on the extent to which any dispute resolution
process can address inequalities in bargaining power that are rooted in social
structures and relations external to the bargaining process. In the private dis-
pute resolution context, critics worry that processes such as mediation will both
obscure inequitable outcomes23 and legitimize them as a product of voluntary
consent.2 Adjudication, however, can similarly reinforce social inequalities.
Adjudication can provide a public record, provide a check on the quality of
legal representation, and has the potential to generate new substantive norms,
but it is also highly constrained in its ability to address poverty and inequality.25
Not only is litigation dependent on the resources of the disputants, but many
judges also remain insensitive to the impact of systemic inequalities26 and to a
host of process-based shortcomings that plague female litigants. These limita-
dons for Practice" (1998) 15 Mediation Q 227 at 231-32. See also Desmond Ellis &
Noreen Stuckless, Mediating and Negotiating Marital Conflicts (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996)
at 64-65 [Ellis & Stuckless, Mediating]. Ellis and Stuckless suggest that offsetting factors in
individual cases may include differences in commitment to the relationship, one's youth or
attractiveness to other mates, or a personal commitment to gender equality.
23. See Martha Shaffer, "Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L
Rev. 162; Sandra A. Goundry, Yvonne Peters & Rosalind Currie, Family Mediation in
Canada: Implicationsfor Women 's Equality: A Review of the Literature andAnalysis of Data
from Four Publicly Funded Canadian Mediation Programs (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 1998) at 39-41.
24. See Wanda Wiegers, "Economic Analysis of Law and 'Private Ordering': A Feminist
Critique" (1990) 42 U.T.LJ. 170; Allison Diduck, Law's Families (London: LexisNexis UK,
2003) at 103-130.
25. On the limits of privatized remedies in family law, see e.g. Mary Jane Mossman, "Child
Support or Support for Children? Re-Thinking 'Public' and 'Private' in Family Law" (1997)
46 U.N.B.L.J. 63; Margrit Eichler, "The Limits of Family Law Reform, or The Privatization
of Female and Child Poverty" (1990) 7 Can. Fam. L.Q 59.
26. Martha Shaffer, "Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court's Decision in Hartshorne
v. Hartshorne" (2004) 20 Can. J. Fam. L 261; Carol Rogerson, "Miglin v. Miglin: They are
Agreements Nonetheless," Case Comment, (2003) 20 Can. J. Fam. L. 197 at 225; and Susan
B. Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women's Work (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003).
For concerns regarding the failure to account for the impact of abuse in custody and access
contexts, see e.g. Linda Neilson, "Partner Abuse, Children and Statutory Change: Cautionary
Comments on Women's Access to Justice" (2000) 18 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 115 [Neilson,
"Partner Abuse"]; Lorraine Greaves et aL, A Motherhood Issue: Discourses on Mothering under
Duress (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2002); and Martha Shaffer, "The Impact of Wife
Abuse on Child Custody and Access Decisions" (2004) 22 Can. Fam. L.Q 85.
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tions include litigation's tendency to escalate hostilities and delay a resolution,
clients' lack of control or understanding of the proceedings, high financial
costs, and use of the process to harass and control."
No dispute resolution method will provide a panacea, but processes may
well differ in their potential to mitigate the impact of inequalities and offer
other benefits to clients. Advocates of CL have argued that the more extensive
involvement of lawyers, among other features, has the potential to deal more
effectively with vulnerable clients than current forms of either litigation or fam-
ily mediation.28 We agree that CL's potential in managing gender inequalities
flows largely from the integration of lawyers in the process because counsel can
facilitate the provision of more thorough legal advice and more individualized
27. Sandra A. Goundry, Final Report on Court-Related Harassment and Family Law 7Justice" A
Review of the Literature &Analysis of Case Law (Ottawa: National Association of Women and
the Law, 1998); Goundry, Peters & Currie, supra note 23 at 32. Linda Neilson's New
Brunswick study documented high rates of continuing litigation in partner abuse cases and
also found a pattern of practice in which lawyers, judges, and mediators pressured clients to
agree to generic settlements. Neilson attributes this practice to limited resources in the
system, particularly where family legal aid is farmed out on a tariff basis. See Linda Neilson,
SpousalAbuse, Children and the Legal System: Final Reportfor Canadian Bar Association, Law
./r the Futures Fund (Fredericton: Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for Family Violence
Research, 2001), online: <http://www.unbf.calarts/CFVR/documents/spousal-abuse.pdf>
[Neilson, SpousalAbuse]. A study recently completed at the University of British Columbia
reveals that one-third of divorce litigants felt pressured to agree to unfair compromises.
Parties who feel disadvantaged are less satisfied with the overall results, and one-quarter of
litigants with children felt that custody or access was used to pressure settlement See Kari
Boyle, "Resolving Family Law Disputes - From the Inside Out" (Lecture delivered at Come
Back to the Core, National Conference of the Conflict Resolution Network Canada, Kitchener,
Ontario, 2 June 2004) [unpublished, on file with authors]. For a discussion of the effects of
mothers' fears of losing custody on negotiations, see Penelope Eileen Bryan, "Women's
Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion" (1999) 47 Buff. L. Rev.
1153 at 1201. Davis, Cretney, and Collins found that women appeared more satisfied with
adjudicated outcomes (relative to conventional lawyer-led settlements) in the United
Kingdom, but also found that both the settlement and adjudicative processes favoured
"whichever party [had] the greater capacity to withhold information and tolerate delay."
Davis, Cremy & Collins, supra note 18 at 262, 224-27; see also Erlanger, Chambliss &
Melli, supra note 18.
28. See e.g. Nancy J. Cameron, Collaborative Practice: Deepening the Dialogue (Vancouver: The
Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 2004) at 156; Tesler, supra note 7
at 9. Shields, Ryan, and Smith tie the deficiencies of mediation to the absence of lawyers
from the process. Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6 at 30.
WIEGERS & KEET, COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW 741
negotiating support. This potential, however, will not be fully realized unless
lawyers demonstrate high levels of sensitivity to imbalances, utilize effective
screening strategies, provide timely and specific legal advice, and work at
achieving deeper and more effective client-lawyer communication. In particu-
lar, we raise serious concerns regarding the risks arising from the use of the
standard disqualification provision (DP), which heightens the importance of
building adequate screening into the process.
Given the limitations in current research on the specific impact of CL, the
analysis we provide is by necessity speculative or exploratory in nature and is
limited to the variables we identify. In Part I, we examine the common goals
and background norms of mediation and CL, and provide a summary of the
extensive literature on gender imbalances in the context of mediation. In Part
II, the potential risks we identify are evaluated in light of the unique structural
features of the CL process.
I. EVIDENCE OF OUTCOMES AND BACKGROUND NORMS
Although CL agreements vary across communities of practice, the background
norms and goals of CL closely mirror those of family mediation.2' Both proc-
esses follow the basic stages of an interest-based model: identifying issues,
exploring interests, generating options, and reaching agreement. 0 Both CL and
family mediation strive to return ownership of the problem-and the solu-
tion-to the clients and, through future-oriented, co-operative frameworks,
seek to avoid strategic positional bargaining, improve communication, and fa-
cilitate emotional healing.31 Proponents of both processes claim similar benefits:
psychological empowerment, emotional healing, durable agreements, and, in
the best of cases, personal transformation.2
29. For sample agreements, see Tesler, ibid at 143; Shields, Ryan & Smith, ibid at Appendix E;
and Landau, Wolfson & Landau, supra note 7 at 406.
30. Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, Getting to YES: NegotiatingAgreement Without
Giving In, 2d ed. (New York Penguin, 1991). See also Tesler, ibid.; Shields, Ryan & Smith,
ibid. at 127; and Landau, Wolfson & Landau, ibid.
31. See references supra note 7.
32. While there is currently insufficient evidence regarding the substantive outcomes of the CL
process (see below, notes 112-113 and accompanying text), collaborative lawyers in our study
believed that CL generated such benefits. For an analysis of the benefits of mediation, see
Joan B. Kelly, "Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?" (2004)
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Researchers have had more opportunity to evaluate the outcomes of media-
don given its long-established use in the family law field; yet, even in this
context, alleged benefits have not been conclusively established or universally
acknowledged. Connie Beck and Bruce Sales, for example, question the extent
to which existing studies of mediation use sound methodologies33 and point out
that, when separated by gender, the results of empirical studies of satisfaction
rates are mixed.' Empirical assessments of substantive outcomes are sparse,
likely due to the difficulty of controlling for all salient variables-and again the
results are mixed.35 Research also overlooks the effect of mediation on distinc-
tive groups of women, such as racialized women or homosexual women.
3 6
22 Conflict Resol. Q 3; Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, "Perspectives on the
Divorce Process: Parental Perceptions of the Legal System and its Impact on Family Relations"
(2000) 29 J. Am. Acad. Psyc. & L 18; and Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The
Promise ofMediation Responding to Confct Through Empowerment and Recognition (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994). For critiques of this perspective, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
"The Many Ways of Mediation" (1995) 11 Negotiation J. 217; Michael Williams, "Can't I
Get No Satisfaction? Thoughts on The Promise of Mediation" (1997) 15 Mediation Q 143.
33. Studies do not consistently define rates of satisfaction or control for important differences
between groups such as the timing of comparisons, the type of issues settled, and variations in
mediation programs and approaches. See Connie JA Beck & Bruce D. Sales, Family Mediation
Facts, Myths, and Future Prospects (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2001)
at 78, 82-90. Much of the empirical research on family mediation relates to court-connected
mediation programs both in the United States and Canada. See e.g. Alberta Law Reform
Institute, Court-Connected Family Mediation Programs in Canada (Edmonton: Alberta Law
Reform Institute, 1994), online: <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ docs/rp020.pdf>.
34. A California study on custody disputes found that fathers were more likely to feel that
mothers had an unfair advantage in mediation as opposed to litigation. In contrast, a
Virginia study found that fathers felt that their rights were more likely to be protected in
mediation as opposed to litigation, and that mothers reported less satisfaction in mediation.
See Beck & Sales, ibia at 88-90. Kelly suggests that these differences likely reflect different
legal rules related to custody in the two jurisdictions. Kelly, supra note 32. In Neilson's
qualitative study of publidy-funded mediation and lawyer negotiation services, dients who
had experienced abuse complained of both processes in much the same terms, particularly in
relation to the non-recognition of abuse and the pressure to abandon claims and accept
generic settlements. Neilson, "Partner Abuse," supra note 26.
35. For a discussion of outcome patterns, see Kelly, ibid, In terms of financial outcomes, see
Jessica Pearson, "The Equity of Mediated Divorce Agreements" (1991) 9 Mediation Q 179.
Despite recognizing that more research was needed, Pearson found that mediated outcomes
generated results similar to adjudicated outcomes.
36. See Trina Grillo, "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women" (1991) 100 Yale
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Drawing on the largest longitudinal study of mediation conducted in Can-
ada, Desmond Ellis and Noreen Stuckless found that women in a voluntary,
publicly-funded mediation sample were more likely to be satisfied with child
support alone, but women in the lawyer negotiation sample, funded through
legal aid tariffs, more often obtained sole legal custody.3" They also found that
differences in income, or the experience of abuse, did not significantly correlate
with outcomes, which considered access, custody or property division, and lev-
els of child support among wives in both samples.38 It is important to note that
couples with "power imbalances great enough to adversely influence the bar-
gaining capacity of the partners" were screened out of the mediation sample at
intake and that abusive behavior was consistently monitored by trained media-
tors throughout the process.3' Ellis and Stuckless also did not assess the impact
of either process on spousal support. It is unclear with what specificity they
examined property division because the economic differences between parties
did not appear to have been great in either sample. In a subsequent article,
Desmond Ellis and Laurie Wight note that available evidence "strongly sug-
gests" that "[economic] resources ought to be included in a theory of
interpersonal power in divorce mediation.""0
In its findings on the question of custody, the Ellis and Stuckless study is
consistent with others that suggest a tendency among mediators to favour joint
custody or shared parenting. 1 Critics have complained that this tendency re-
L.J. 1545 at 1579-81 (discussing its impact on black women). See also William Manson
Emnett, "Queer Conflicts: Mediating Parenting Disputes within the Gay Community"
(1997) 86 Geo. L.J. 433; Hilary Astor, "Mediation of Intra-Lesbian Disputes" (1996) 20
Melbourne U.L Rev. 953.
37. Ellis & Stuckless, Mediating, supra note 22 at 85-86.
38. Ibii at 69, 71.
39. Ibid at 77. It is not dear whether these couples were eventually screened out; however, the
authors note that the mediators consciously attempted to expand the support services
available to weaker parties. More women in the lawyer negotiation sample also experienced
abuse within six months of separation, but this was not found to be statistically significant in
explaining the differences between the samples. Ellis and Stuckless did find a higher
incidence of post-processing abuse in the legal negotiation sample, an outcome they
attributed largely to the impact of hurtful affidavits.
40. Ellis & Wight, supra note 22 at 228.
41. A disproportionate number of mediators in the United States favour joint custody in
principle. See Jessica Pearson, "Mediating When Domestic Violence is a Factor: Policies and
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flects a bias on the part of mediators who present their primary concerns as
emotional healing, equal participation, and minimal conflict, and are insensi-
tive both to the impact of the primary care role performed disproportionately
by women and to issues of abuse.'2 In 1988, Martha Fineman argued that the
use of family mediation and the growing influence of social workers and psy-
chologists had precipitated a shift in substantive norms toward shared parenting
and had dramatically reallocated power between mothers and fathers. 3 While
this emphasis on contact and joint custody has since become increasingly evi-
dent in all legal modes of dispute resolution, including lawyer-to-lawyer
negotiations, pre-trial conferences, and adjudicated outcomes, it is likely inten-
sified through the collaborative frame of mediation.
Early research into CL has shown high settlement rates" but has also raised
red flags about a similar "harmony agenda" 5 that is linked to a specific concep-
tion of what "healthy family transitions" entail.' 6 Prominent CL authors, such
as Nancy Cameron and Pauline Tesler, emphasize the importance of de-
escalating conflict and acrimony for the sake of the children, promote the im-
portance of contact with each parent through the restructuring of the post-
Practices in Court-Based Divorce Mediation Programs" (1997) 14 Mediation Q 319 at 320.
42. See e.g. Grillo, supra note 36 at 1568, 1572-81, 1594; Goundry, supra note 27 at 48-49; and
Penelope E. Bryan, "Killing Us Softly Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power" (1992)
40 Buff. L. Rev. 441 at 492. This preference can reinforce the husband's control over
important decisions without changing the day-to-day responsibility for children and
undermine both the mother's bargaining power in relation to financial issues and her
legitimate concerns about parenting matters. See Boyd, supra note 26 at 123, 223. The pro-
contact preference relies heavily on selected empirical studies on child development that have
been the subject of critical commentary. See Neilson, "Partner Abuse," supra note 26 at 122-
24; Martha Shaffer, "Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children's Adjustment to
Divorce: What the Social Science Literature Does and Does Not Tell Us" (2007) 26
C.F.LQ. 285; and Carol Bruch, "Sound Research or Wishful Thinking in Child Custody
Cases? Lessons from Relocation Law" (2006) 40 Fam. LQ. 281.
43. Martha Fineman, "Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727. For a critique of the move towards
privately negotiated collaborative parenting in the United Kingdom, see Bren Neale & Carol
Smart, "'Good' and 'bad' lawyers? Struggling in the shadow of the new law" (1997) J. Soc.
Welfare & Fam. L. 377.
44. Schwab, supra note 5 at 375. It was found that 87.4 per cent of dients settled in his sample.
45. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 35, 80.
46. Ibid at 26,49, 71-85.
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divorce family, and portray the adversarial system largely as a catalyst for in-
creased hostilities."7 Within such a normative vision, the parties' interests are
focused on maintaining a good relationship between parents, promoting future
cooperation, and settling promptly without protracted debate. 8
In some respects, CL goes further than mediation to de-emphasize adver-
sarial tendencies and defuse conflict. In addition to the DP, which intensifies
the commitment to settlement, CL requires a more overt commitment to the
concept of teamwork: "the lawyers and clients work together as a team of
equals, all pulling together on the same side of the problem."' The commit-
ment of each party's lawyer to these ideals has the potential to reinforce the
collaborative framework to a greater extent than typically occurs in mediation.
This "harmony agenda" can also affect women differently than men. On
the one hand, CL's value orientation may strongly validate negotiation behav-
iour or an "ethic of care" that, some argue, is more common to women, both as
clients and lawyers.5" To the extent that they do prefer collaborative negotia-
tion, CL might provide some comfort to women and simultaneously influence
or put pressure on men to adopt a more co-operative, conciliatory style.51 Ulti-
mately, the magnitude of this benefit depends on how successful the CL process
is in encouraging men to abandon strategic, adversarial bargaining. While CL's
formalized collaborative approach may be more successful in this respect than
47. Cameron, supra note 28 at 71-85; Tesler, supra note 7 at 12, 19, 33-34, 74-75. See also
Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6 at 159-69.
48. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 34, 49.
49. Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6 at 39.
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "What's Gender Got to Do with it? The Politics and Morality
of an Ethic of Care" (1996-97) 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 265. A Canadian study
revealed that female lawyers in family law were more likely to describe their styles as more
conciliatory than their male counterparts. See Joan Brockman, Gender in the Legal Profession:
Fitting or Breaking the Mould (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001). For further discussion on the
relationship between gender and lawyering styles, see e.g. Lynn Mather, "Gender in Context:
Women in Family Law" in Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw, eds., Women in the World's Legal
Professions (Portland: Hart, 2003) 33; Deborah L Rhode, "Gender and Professional Roles"
(1994-95) 63 Fordham L. Rev. 39; and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Exploring a Research
Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change"
(1989) 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 289.
51. See e.g. Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9 at 169-71, 174-76, where Mary's story
suggests that the process did have a transformative effect.
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mediation, if unsuccessful, the process may simply induce a false sense of secu-
rity in women. As Trina Grillo indicates in relation to mediation: "[i]f she is
easily persuaded to be co-operative, but her partner is not, she can only lose. "52
The emphasis on familial welfare can also pressure weaker parties, typically
mothers, to abandon legitimate claims to reduce conflict and obtain closure. 3
The emphasis on harmony may be particularly problematic for victims in abu-
sive relationships since it can compound an abused spouse's reluctance or
impaired ability to communicate.' Linda Neilson's New Brunswick study55
found evidence that both mediators and lawyers failed to recognize abuse and
pressured clients to accept generic settlements. Case studies of mediation in
England also suggest that allegations of violence, even if identified through
screening instruments, can often be sidelined, marginalized, and eventually dis-
counted.5 6 In her study of CL, Julie Macfarlane notes one instance where a
client could not admit, in the joint four-way meeting, that she was afraid to go
home that night because the parties were cohabiting.7
As is common in mediation, the Collaborative Law Contract in Saskatche-
wan specifies that "unnecessary discussions of past events are to be avoided." 8
52. Grillo, supra note 36 at 1603.
53. For discussion of the role of familial ideology in child custody disputes, see Boyd, supra note 26.
54. Beck & Sales, supra note 33 at 28-3 1; Rosemary Hunter, "Adversarial Mythologies: Policy
Assumptions and Research Evidence in Family Law" (2003) 30 J.L & Soc'y 156 at 172
[Hunter, "Adversarial Mythologies"]. See also Jessica Pearson, "Ten Myths about Family
Law" (1993) 27 Fam. L.Q. 279 at 288.
55. Clients also complained about the use of mediation to perpetuate abuse and the lack of in-
vestigation regarding the best interests of the children. See Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra note
27 at 151. In Neilson's study of 147 court cases involving alleged spousal abuse, mothers
failed to contest access in 58 per cent and custody in 8 per cent of the cases. See Neilson,
"Partner Abuse," supra note 26 at 141-49.
56. See David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, "The Marginalization of Domestic Violence in
Divorce Mediation" (1999) 13 Int'l J.L. Pol'y & Fam. 174. Greatbatch and Dingwall examined
audio-recordings of 121 divorce mediation sessions and found that "[t]he process of
marginalization we have identified is a very general phenomenon" (at 185). See also Sara Cobb,
"The Domestication of Violence in Mediation" (1997) 31 Law & Soc'y Rev. 397, who
examined thirty mediation sessions and concluded that "violence appears with significant
frequency ... [and] when it does appear, it is domesticated with significant regularity" (at 436).
57. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 35.
58. Article 4.3, Model Saskatchewan Collaborative Law Contract (Adopted by Collaborative
Lawyers of Saskatchewan, Inc.) [Saskatchewan Contract].
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This exclusive orientation toward the future can suppress not only the disclo-
sure of past domestic violence or abuse,5' but also the expression of negative
feelings that may be necessary for empowerment or healing.6" Although col-
laborative strategies typically acknowledge emotions, critics argue that they
can discourage the expression of anger, which, in the context of abuse or vio-
lence, can silence a spouse who should otherwise be speaking out.61 Tesler, a
leading proponent of CL, suggests that lawyers should help clients avoid their
"shadow states," which are described as "the temporary upwelling(s) of intense
and primitive emotions such as fear, rage, grief, or shame."62 In an effort to
preserve the ideal of the "higher self," CL lawyers may thus inadvertently sup-
press their clients' anger and other intense emotions that can legitimately arise
from abuse.
Given these substantive and co-operative norms, CL can be expected to
generate concerns regarding gender-based power imbalances that are similar to
those cited in the mediation context. The question, to be examined in the next
part of this article, is how effectively the unique procedural framework of CL
can address or moderate the impact of such power imbalances.
59. Even where allegations of violence do surface, they may be discounted largely because they
cannot be substantiated within informal dispute resolution processes, as they would be in an
expedited investigatory and adjudicative process. See Hunter, "Adversarial Mythologies,"
supra note 54 at 165-66. This turn away from fact finding is also described as a retreat from
justice. See e.g. Ronalda Murphy, "Is the Turn toward Collaborative Law a Turn Away from
Justice?" (2004) 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 460. See also Cobb, supra note 56.
60. In our exploratory research, for example, two dients had not explicitly disclosed emotional
abuse to their lawyers. In another case, a dient attended a stand-alone, four-way meeting
despite not having signed onto the entire CL process. The client discussed her concerns
about the relationship's abusive dynamic with her lawyer but still felt the pressure to suppress
her honest reactions during the process in the interest of maintaining civility. She did not
feel permitted to "stand up" for herself and experienced pressure to continue old patterns,
where she had to "eat a lot of stuff and not respond." Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note
9 at 172, 186-87, 182-83, 198. Shelley Day Sclater argues that all clients have a need to
make sense of the past-a psychological need for resolution that may necessitate the
expression of negative feelings and the attribution of blame. Shelley Day Sclater, "Narratives
of Divorce" (1997) 19 J. Soc. Welfare & Fain. L. 423.
61. This can be identified as a risk in mediation. See Grillo, supra note 36 at 1572-8 1; Lydia
Belzer, "Domestic Abuse and Divorce Mediation: Suggestions for a Safer Process" (2003) 5
Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 37 at 48.
62. Tesler, supra note 7 at 80.
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II. STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF COLLABORATIVE LAW
A. ENTRENCHMENT OF LAWYERS INTO THE PROCESS
In family mediation, clients typically consult lawyers only on a periodic basis,
outside sessions or after a tentative agreement has been reached. 63 In CL, by
contrast, the lawyers of each client are actively involved and jointly part of the
process from the outset. One of the principal arguments advanced by scholars,"
lawyers, 65 and clients66 who favour CL is that the ongoing involvement of law-
yers can effectively address power imbalances. In the mediation context, Jane
Murphy and Robert Rubinson similarly argue that legal advocates can act as
"power enhancers and equalizers," as "they can speak on behalf of clients,
evaluate proposed solutions in light of applicable legal norms and the specific
experiences of the client, and, if necessary, suggest opting out of the mediation
itself if it is not serving the interests of the client."
6
It is not entirely clear why family mediation has developed without the
continuous presence of legal advocates. The emphasis on therapeutic interven-
63. Macfarlane, "Experiences," supra note 5 at 182; Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra
note 5 at 72; Tesler, ibid at 97; D. Todd Sholar, "Collaborative Law -A Method for the
Madness" (1993) 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 667 at 674; and John Lande & Gregg Herman,
"Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law or
Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases" (2004) 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 280 (highlighting
this distinction between process options). Note that the non-involvement of lawyers appears
to be a convention unique to family law.
64. Sholar, ibiad; Tesler, ibid at 9, 225, 674-75; Hunter, "Future," supra note 5; Cameron, supra
note 28 at 156; and Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6 at 30 (tying the deficiencies of
mediation to the absence of lawyers from the process).
65. Brett Raymond Degoldi, Lawyers'Experiences of Coliaborative Family Law (LL.M. thesis,
University of British Columbia, 2007) at 123-24 Junpublished, on file with authors]. Many
lawyers in Degoldi's study argued that mediators were limited in their ability to manage
power imbalances without being perceived as biased.
66. A group of dients in the Macfarlane study deliberately chose CL over mediation because they
believed CL would reduce the risk of poor and unequal outcomes. See Macfarlane, Emerging
Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 71-72. One of the clients in our study, Barbara, expressed
similar hopes. See Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9.
67. Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, "Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to
the Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens" (2005) 39 Fam. LQ 53 at 66. See also Beck &
Sales, supra note 33 at 53, 63 (noting that according to one qualitative study, mediation with
a lawyer provided the best scenario).
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tion in the divorce context68 and the lack of a functional role for lawyers inside
the mediation process may have had some impact.6' From a practical stand-
point, family mediators may not have encouraged lawyer participation since
lawyers who lack significant training in dispute resolution and have not inter-
nalized co-operative norms can critically undermine the possibility of
collaboration. Perhaps one of the most influential factors weighing against law-
yer participation has been the cost to clients.
CL can also increase costs relative to the cost of a single mediator. William
Schwab's survey in the United States produced a profile for CL clients that was
largely "white, middle-aged, well-educated and affluent.""0 Surveys conducted
by collaborative organizations also suggest that CL is significantly more costly
than mediation."1 These studies, however, do not indicate whether the costs of
legal advice have been factored into the mediation tab, nor do they control for
factors such as degrees of conflict or complexity.
The recruitment of lawyers into the heart of the dispute resolution process
in CL would appear to increase protection for vulnerable clients. However, a
number of assumptions underlie this conclusion: that lawyers can effectively
determine whether and how clients ought to participate in collaborative proc-
esses, that lawyer involvement increases the client's access to legal information,
and that lawyers can provide clients with the right balance of self-determination
and negotiation support. The following discussion explores the extent to which
these assumptions are likely to be true in the CL context.
1. SCREENING FOR POWER IMBALANCES AND ABUSE
Despite the development of protocols and screening tools, there are still no
clear criteria among mediators for determining "what a power difference is and
68. See Fineman, supra note 43.
69. Douglas H. Yarn, "The Attorney as Duelist's Friend: Lessons from the Code Duello" (2000)
51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 69 at 70.
70. Schwab, supra note 5 at 373.
71. A Boston Law Collaborative group analyzed 199 of their own divorce cases and found the
average cost of mediation to be $6,600 as compared to $19,723 for CL. See David Crary,
"Keen Interest in Gender Ways to Divorce" Associated Press (18 December 2007), online
<http://www.collaborativelawdirectory.com/detail/ 14/keen-interest-in-gender-ways-to-divorce-
guardian-unlimited.html>. In qualitative studies, clients have also complained that the CL
process has proven to be longer and more expensive than they anticipated. See Macfarlane,
EmergingPhenomenon, supra note 5 at Postscript, Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9.
750 (2008) 46 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
when it is occurring. "72 Mediation literature addresses power differentials
caused by abuse and individual incapacity but does not adequately acknowledge
inequalities arising from socialized gender roles, differences in earning power,
and contributions to domestic labour that affect the bargaining process.7 3 Me-
diators largely agree that allegations of domestic violence require "special
treatment"' and support the screening out of cases involving systematic pat-
terns of control-physical, emotional, or economic abuse-particularly where
women victims are fearful or abusive partners seek to hide, deny, or minimize
abuse. 5 Although academic discussion suggests that mediators have a fairly high
level of consciousness of domestic violence, empirical research suggests that
mediators in practice often fail to screen for it.7 6 Critics argue that mediators
72. Beck & Sales, supra note 33 at 48. See also Goundry, Peters & Currie, supra note 23.
73. See Grillo, supra note 36; Bryan, supra note 42; and Goundry, supra note 27 at 40-41.
74. Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 67 at 54.
75. Ibid, at 58; Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 56 at 187. For examples of situations where
there is a history of serious injury or use or threat of weapons, evidence of fear on part of
victims, or prioritizing the abuser's needs, see Ann L. Milne, "Mediation and Domestic
Abuse" in Jay Folberg, Anne L. Milne & Peter Salem, eds., Divorce and Family Mediation
(New York. Guilford Press, 2004) 304 at 324. Desmond Ellis and Noreen Stuckless note
that there is no evidence that abused women in mediation are more likely to suffer violence
post-separation than abused women in other processes. They propose a risk management
instrument to screen for safety risks (but not apparently for the risk of unfair outcomes). See
Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless, "Separation, Domestic Violence and Divorce
Mediation" (2006) 23 Conflict Resol. Q 461 [Ellis & Stuckless, "Separation"]. For
strategies for dealing with abuse inside mediation, see Beck & Sales, supra note 33 at 50.
76. This appears to be particularly true of court-mandated mediation. See Nancy E. Johnson,
Dennis P. Saccuzzo & Wendy J. Koen, "Child Custody Mediation in Cases of Domestic
Violence" (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 1022. See also Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra
note 27; Alexandria Zylstra, "Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening
Method for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators" (2001) J. Disp. Resol. 253;
and Beck & Sales, ibid. at 52. Research in England revealed the following false assumptions
about domestic violence on the part of some mediators: that domestic violence was mutual
or "as likely to be from women to men as from men to women," and that the violence would
stop as a result of separation, or was not of concern to children of the relationship. See M.
Hester, C. Pearson & L. Radford, Domestic Violence, A National Survey of Court Welfare and
Voluntary Sector Mediation Practice (Bristol: Policy Press, 1997), cited in Felicity Kaganas &
Christine Piper, "Divorce and Domestic Violence" in Shelley Day Sclater & Christine Piper,
eds., Undercurrents of Divorce (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1999) at 198. See also
Greatbatch & Dingwall, ibid at 185.
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underestimate the frequency and impact of power imbalances and rely too
heavily on "quick-fix power balancing techniques.""
Available research suggests that lawyers are not necessarily more conscious
of unequal power or more prepared to deal with screening than mediators.
Neilson's extensive research of case law, court files, and interview data in New
Brunswick in 2001 revealed that evidence of abuse was siphoned off continu-
ously throughout the legal process, possibly because lawyers either failed to
detect abuse or underestimated or discounted its existence. 8
In the CL literature, issues of power and abuse are only beginning to be ac-
knowledged. Collaborative Family Law includes only a few paragraphs on power
issues;7' Collaborative Practice: Deepening the Dialogue devotes more attention to
these issues but acknowledges that the comments offer only a "starting point."
8
Basic CL training sessions may also pay little attention to screening issues, pro-
viding no template or systematic screening checklist and no training on how to
conduct a screening interview.
81
Most of the twelve lawyers we interviewed in 2006 offered CL as a matter
of course, leaving it up to their clients to decide. Although some lawyers indi-
cated that they would not recommend the process in limited circumstances,
there was no consensus either on the range of relevant factors or on what would
constitute a power imbalance82 sufficient to trigger that advice. For example, in
77. Goundry, Peters & Currie, supra note 23 at 45, 56, and 81.
78. Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra note 27. Neilson also argues that lawyers and judges may be
conceptualizing abuse in terms of discrete incidents and abuser intention, overlooking the
history of the relationship, and the consequences of abuse. See Neilson, "Partner Abuse,"
supra note 26 at 129-32, 140-46.
79. Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6 at 56. For suggestions for a broader assessment of the
suitability of CL, see Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 66. A number of the
artides written for practitioners also address this briefly. See e.g. Landau, Wolfson & Landau,
supra note 7.
80. Cameron, supra note 28 at 156. Cameron's list of screening questions does not indude the
more specific questions on power and control dynamics or type, severity, and frequency of
violence and abuse that are often needed to elicit disclosure.
81. See e.g. Janis M. Pritchard, Collaborative Law Training Materials: Solving conflict with a
collaborative process (Medicine Hat: Palliser Conflict Resolution, 2002). A basic training
session attended by the authors in December 2007 also did not address how to identify or
screen out inappropriate cases.
82. Examples cited in the lawyer interviews included lack of trust or financial disclosure during
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suggesting that everyone had "some power," one lawyer who was trained in CL
essentially denied the salience of systemic power differentials.83
In 2005, Brett Degoldi conducted extensive interviews with twenty CL
lawyers in Vancouver." Although most lawyers in both Degoldi's and our study
tended to acknowledge economic imbalances, they appeared to focus concern
on constraints such as the lack of information or on obvious manifestations of
incapacity." On the one hand, such a focus makes sense. Lawyers cannot
change their clients' external resources, but they can attempt to influence their
clients' degree of participation, perceptions of the issues, and behaviour within
the process. On the other hand, this individualized focus on capacity and proc-
ess can desensitize lawyers over time to the more subtle impact of systemic
inequalities which often arise from economic dependencies, entrenched gender
roles, or the long-term corrosive impact of abuse, all of which may render the
process unsuitable for individual clients.
86
In both studies, lawyers who acknowledged the existence of power differen-
tials seemed to believe that these could be remedied through strategies such as
information sharing and joint management by the lawyers.8" More than one
the marriage, unwillingness or inability to communicate, emotional abuse and domestic
violence, substance abuse, severe bargaining disadvantage, and an emergency (for example,
child abduction).
83. RF1.
84. Degoldi, supra note 65.
85. One lawyer described it precisely in these terms: the important questions were how the
parties functioned and whether one was scared or unable to process or reason (RF2). This
approach appears similar to the emphasis on battered women's syndrome in the context of
criminal law in the sense that both approaches tend to identify the dominant issue as one of
women's psychological capacities rather than their objective constraints.
86. In other words, the focus on process can "naturalize" gender inequalities, an outcome that
may be reinforced by the "hegemonic discourse of neutrality and equality" within family law.
See Bryna 13ogoch & Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, "Divorce Israeli Style: Professional Perceptions
of Gender and Power in Mediated and Lawyer-Negotiated Divorces" (2006) 29 Law & Pol'y
137 at 154. See also Alison Diduck, "Dividing the Family Assets" in Sclater & Piper, supra
note 76, 209 at 218-19.
87. Six lawyers in our study expressed this view, although one acknowledged the possibility that
CL was being oversold. "There's a desire ... to make all cases, or most cases, fit into the CL
framework. ... In some cases, we may have been a little too eager" (UM 1). One lawyer in
Degoldi's study indicated that he or she could not create a level playing field, only a safe one.
See Degoldi, supra note 65 at 143, 128.
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lawyer in Saskatchewan used the example of the "timid woman" who manifests
more confidence and self-esteem by the end of the CL process-a change
brought about by education, support, and vigilant enforcement of the ground
rules by both lawyers.88 Feedback from our client sample confirmed that a dis-
empowered woman can find her voice and gain strength in the CL process, but
this was not an inevitable or a common experience in our admittedly small
sample.8 Although all of the clients in our study entered the CL process volun-
tarily, several wished that their lawyers had taken a closer look at whether the
process was actually appropriate in their circumstances and advised them ac-
cordingly." This response suggests that some lawyers may be confusing a
client's voluntary entry into the process with the broader issue of suitability. 1
Lawyers in our study also expressed a range of views on the import of do-
mestic abuse; some screened for it and others did not. 2 It was not clear from
our interviews how many lawyers specifically asked about the existence of types
of abuse or what their purposes were in asking such questions. 3 According to
one lawyer, domestic violence was seldom disclosed at the outset of the CL
process and was something she would not know about in advance, suggesting
again that screening may in practice occur only where a client's negotiation
88. UM2, UM3.
89. Client stories fell across a spectrum of experiences. For a detailed discussion, see Keet,
Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9.
90. Ibid.
91. One lawyer described it as a philosophical tension between lawyer control (how she
envisioned the screening function) and client control (the goal of CL), conduding that the
exercise of screening was somehow incompatible with CL: "[Y]ou're making a decision for
your client, where your dient hasn't even had input yet. You are pre-determining what is
right for this person, knowing them for an hour" (RF2).
92. Two CL lawyers recently argued in favour of the use of CL in cases of domestic violence in
part because litigation tended to escalate the conflict. See Randi Arnot, "Collaborative Law:
How to Best Keep Warm in the Winter" CBA Bar Notes 22:1 (Canadian Bar Association,
Saskatchewan Branch, Fall 2007) at 7-10. Reported cases also confirm that CL has been
attempted where wives, in subsequent litigation, have alleged physical abuse during the
course of the marriage. See e.g. Campbell v. Campbell (2007), 162 A.C.W.S. (3d) 457 (Alta.
QB.) [Campbe1]; S. (C.) v. S. (M.) (2007), 155 A.C.W.S. (3d) 605 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); and
Cloutier v. Berg, [2005] W.D.F.L 2234 (B.C.S.C.)
93. For observations about the failure of family lawyers to screen for domestic violence, see
Zylstra, supra note 76. For an example of a recent approach to screening, see Landau,
Wolfson & Landau, supra note 7 at 177.
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capabilities are visibly or obviously affected." By contrast, although at least one
of the Vancouver lawyers from Degoldi's study indicated that there was always
some element of abuse in every relationship, several others acknowledged that
they were not sufficiently trained to recognize or deal with emotional and
physical abuse.' 5 According to one, "lawyers generally overreach their skill levels"
when cases involve abuse.' 6 A point of difference between our study and De-
goldi's is that the Vancouver lawyers from the latter appeared more concerned
about the limits of their own skills-limits that were possibly more visible given
the prevalence of the interdisciplinary form of CL practised in Vancouver.
The task of screening for domestic violence or emotional abuse-whether
in mediation or in CL-is inherently difficult and requires specialized knowl-
edge of the nature and dynamics of spousal abuse and its long-term effects on
children and victims. Women may raise allegations in indirect and tentative
ways, often to test whether it is safe to provide more extensive disclosure.'" Les-
bian, immigrant, and Aboriginal women are less apt to report violence to
authorities for fear of child protection proceedings, deportation, or loss of status
in their communities, and these fears may inhibit disclosure even in more pri-
vate negotiations. 8 After establishing a basis for trust, lawyers need to screen
using specific questions while also paying attention to behavioural cues, such as
unexplained injuries, absences from work, unusual fear, and avoidance of con-
flict." Faced with ambiguity, lawyers, like mediators, may tend too often to
reformulate the victim's story to conform to the presumptions of equality that
underpin collaborative processes."'
94. RF1.
95. Degoldi, supra note 65 at 123.
96. ibid at 135.
97. Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 56.
98. For a review of authorities, see Jennifer Koshan & Wanda Wiegers, "Theorizing Civil
Domestic Violence Legislation in the Context of Restructuring. A Tale of Two Provinces"
(2007) 19 C.J.W.L. 145 at 167-68.
99. Wendy J. Koen, Dennis P. Saccuzzo & Nancy E. Johnson, "Custody Mediation in Violent
and Nonviolent Families: Pitfalls and Perils" (2006) 19 Am. J. Fam. L 253 at 260. See also
Milne, supra note 75 at 323; Deborah Lynn Zutter, "Mediation in the Shadow of Abuse -
An Update" (2002) 20 Can. Fam. L.Q 65 at 86-93.
100. See Zylstra, supra note 76. Such evidence raises the theoretical question of whether screening
can balance out deeply embedded collaborative norms. See the discussion of the impact of
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The potential for abuse or violence to remain hidden suggests that lawyers
require specific training not only to identify its existence, but also to assess the
type of violence and the magnitude of risks clients may face."' Standard screen-
ing protocols should be used to help lawyers recognize the continuum of abuse
and respond in different ways, such as by declining to proceed, recommending
against the process, or proceeding with safety or other supportive measures
clearly in place. Abusive spouses may contest allegations of abuse, and they may
be highly skilled in presenting themselves. To identify spousal abuse and distin-
guish it from claims of mutual abuse, a lawyer must examine the history of the
relationship and consider both the context in which the violence or abuse oc-
curs and its consequences. Third party verification of claims and counter-claims
may also need to be explored.
1 02
Relationships involving a history of escalating acts or threats of harm
against spouses or children (or threats of, or attempted suicide), along with a
pattern of domination, control, or obsessive jealousy can particularly pose a
serious risk to the well-being of victims and children, and to the possibility of
an agreement that meets the parties' needs.103 In such circumstances, conven-
mediator neutrality in Goundry, Peters & Currie, supra note 23 at 55; Rachel Field, "Federal
Family Law Reform in 2005: The Problems and Pitfalls for Women and Children of an
Increased Emphasis on Post-Separation Informal Dispute Resolution" (2005) 5 Queensland
U. Tech. L & Jus. J. 28 at 33.
101. Risk factors indude the severity, frequency, and recentness of violence, control-instigated
emotional abuse or violence, substance abuse, mental illness, and a prior criminal record. See
e.g. Wanda Wiegers & Fiona Douglas, Civil Domestic Violence Legislation in Saskatchewan:
An assessment ofthefirst decade (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2007) at 7-13;
Nicholas Bala, Peter G. Jaffe & Claire V. Crooks, "Spousal Violence and Child-Related
Cases: Challenging Cases Requiring Differentiated Responses" (2007) 27 Can. Fam. L.Q 1
at 32-33.
102. See Lundy Bancroft & Jay G. Silverman, The Batterer as Parent Addressing the Impact of
Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002) at 3-19; Linda C.
Neilson, "Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in Child Custody and Access Cases"
(2004) 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 411. In Degoldi, supra note 65 at 138, one Vancouver lawyer
believed that the CL process provided an important way of holding the abuser to account
and preventing exaggeration on the part of the victim. This response reflected both
skepticism towards allegations of abuse and undue confidence that the truth of the
allegations can be identified in CL without undermining the co-operative framework.
103. For a discussion of screening variables, see Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra note 27 at
Appendix; Zutter, supra note 99; and Ellis & Stuckless, "Separation," supra note 75.
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tional advocacy, rather than CL or mediation, could result in more ready access
to restraining or protective orders, less direct exposure to the abusive party, and
less risk that the victim's substantive claims will be devalued.
Assumptions that power imbalances can be easily managed, even through
the joint action of lawyers, belies the complexity of these issues. While screen-
ing is essential for mediation, it is even more important in CL, given the
heightened costs of terminating the process and the inevitability of face-to-face
encounters through the use of four-way meetings.'
2. AMBIGUITY OVER THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL NORMS
To the extent that legal entitlements provide a defence against the impact of
power imbalances, the ongoing presence of lawyers in the CL process could
render legal advice more accessible and help to ensure that a client's legal enti-
dements are respected. Studies to date, however, find significant variations
between CL lawyers in how much legal advice they give, when they give it, and
how specific it is to the client's situation.0 These differences in practice reflect
differences in the weight lawyers themselves place on legal entitlements relative
to the "interests" identified by clients in the negotiation process. As with media-
tion, CL acknowledges that both parties' interests can be fully met outside the
bounds of legal norms.10 6 Indeed, proponents of CL argue that legal positions
easily get in the way of creative problem solving. Instead, clients should feel
"free to compromise and substitute their own standards of acceptability and
reasonableness for the legal standard,"0 7 and lawyers should avoid "premature
advice-giving [that] may put a chill on the negotiations.."08
Lawyers in our study emphasized to varying degrees their obligation to
provide specific legal advice. On one end of the spectrum, some resisted giving
104. See Neilson, SpousalAbuse, ibid. at 164, where she encourages the use of shuttle rather than
face-to-face mediation in cases involving domestic violence or patterns of control or
psychological abuse. See text accompanying infra notes 133-72.
105. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 36-38; Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra
note 9; and Lande, supra note 5. As well as varying from lawyer to lawyer, practices vary
across different communities of practice or jurisdictions-a reality that is acknowledged in
CL training sessions.
106. The Honourable James C. MacDonald, "Introduction" in Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6, i.
107. Ibid. See also Tesler, supra note 7.
108. MacDonald, ibid.
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legal norms a significant role in the process, fearing that a sense of one's enti-
dements runs counter to the interest-based orientation of CL.1"' They may
provide information to clients, usually in the four-way meetings, about "what
the law says," but they avoid characterizing it as an entitlement or obligation, or
otherwise "shading" it in their client's favour."' This approach raises questions
as to whether the fiduciary obligation of lawyers to provide specific advice to
their clients is being met. Other lawyers were influenced by a more traditional
sense of their role. One lawyer explained that "[o]ur assessment of legal enti-
tlement is the guideline, and a very important guideline, in determining if the
process is successful or not."11
While the extent to which clients in our study understood and attempted to
fully obtain their legal entitlements also varied, we did not attempt to assess out-
comes, and the potential for bargaining pressures to result in imbalanced
agreements remains largely unmeasured. Macfarlane's analysis of sixteen cases sug-
gests that, from the perspective of the lawyers involved, CL outcomes were not
significantly different than their litigated outcomes would have been.112 Nonethe-
less, her call for "extreme vigilance" acknowledges the risk to weaker parties.113
Unfortunately, our lawyer and client interviews suggest that some CL law-
yers are divesting themselves of the protective role advocated by Murphy and
Robinson in mediation. 1 ' This is problematic because less powerful clients may
be losing access to legal standards that have evolved over time precisely to pro-
tect their interests. These standards are especially significant in family cases,
given the social devaluation of women's domestic labour and the prevalence of
109. For example, RF2. See also Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 37.
110. UM2. See also RF2; RM3.
111. RM1. Some lawyers may give legal advice from the outset for pragmatic reasons, fearing that
clients will get ad4ice elsewhere in a distorted form ot feeling the need to shift a client's
position before the four-way if that position is wholly incompatible with legal norms or
otherwise not sustainable ('raining Session 2007).
112. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 59.
113. Ibid at xii, 57, 78. The author noted that more research is needed to test her tentative
conclusion.
114. See Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra note 27 at 168-69, who argues that mediation and
adversarial processes should be kept separate because vulnerable dients value partisan support
and advocacy. For some CL lawyers, the retreat from legal norms is not only logically driven
by the ideological frame of CL, but also proves to be uncomfortable for some participants.
RF2 observed: "that's one of the balances we're struggling with."
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abuse. In this context, legal norms remain an important benchmark against
which a client can assess her interests.
3. TRADITIONAL ADVOCACY AND EMOTIONAL SUPPORT
In its emphasis on client self-determination and control as a central norm of the
process,115 CL calls for a reformulation of the lawyer-client relationship and a
redefinition of lawyer advocacy. In line with this objective, CL agreements typi-
cally provide that each client is expected to assert his or her own interests, and
lawyers attempt to avoid reinforcing feelings of dependency or treating the cli-
ent as simply a passive recipient of terms or entitlements. However, feedback
from our study suggests that vulnerable clients may still depend heavily on their
lawyers as a source of emotional support.1 6 Clients who complained of abuse in
their relationships objected to their lawyers' "hands-off' approach; they felt
they needed an advocate to "back [them] up,"11. to respond to harassment and
put-downs, and to help them "stand up to" 18 their spouse. CL lawyers must
therefore navigate not only a tension between "zealous advocacy" and "peace-
making," " ' but also a tension between client autonomy and protective support
and representation.
Are lawyers adequately equipped to fulfill these complex expectations given
the emotional intensity of such negotiations, the manipulative dynamics of
longstanding abusive relationships, and the limits of conventional legal train-
ing?2' For economically privileged clients, many of these concerns may be
115. Larry R. Spain, "Collaborative Law- A Critical Reflection on Whether a Collaborative Orien-
tation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law" (2004) 56 Baylor L. Rev. 141
at 143; Sandra S. Beckwith & Sherri Goren Slovin, "The Collaborative Lawyer as Advocate:
A Response" (2003) 18 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 497 at 499.
116. See Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9.
117. See Barbara's account, ibid at 186.
118. See Julia's and Cynthia's accounts, ibid at 187. Lande notes that "[p]arties who feel weaker
than their spouses ... may hire lawyers precisely to give them a sense of control in an adverse
situation." lande, supra note 5 at 1363.
119. It is argued that CL requires a different conception of "zealous advocacy" but is not inher-
ently inconsistent with it Lande, ibid at 1331. See also Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon,
supra note 5 at 44.
120. Legal training and methodology have tended to dismiss the relevance of emotional influences
for both dients and lawyers in the resolution of legal disputes. See Marjorie A. Silver, "Love,
Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship" in Dennis P.
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mitigated by the involvement of other counsellors, such as mental health pro-
fessionals who work separately with clients; however, this Cadillac version of
CL is not widely accessible.
Managing these issues requires intensive lawyer-client communication such
as open, ongoing feedback from the client to the lawyer through initial screen-
ing and preparatory interviews. Relative to a single mediator, CL lawyers are in
a position to provide more individualized negotiating support. Lawyers can also
try to work as a team in order to challenge rather than reinforce power imbal-
ances between the parties."' While engaging the efforts of both lawyers is a
creative and no doubt helpful response, there are also limits to this strategy. In
the context of longstanding abusive relationships, these strategies may simply be
unable to alter the dynamics.122 Lawyers for an abusive spouse can only go so far
to contain the abuse because of their professional duty to represent their indi-
vidual client. Without adequate support, professional teamwork can leave the
abused client feeling isolated, unprotected, or abandoned. 23 These limitations
again underline the importance of careful screening.
In summary, the integration of lawyers into CL can provide a number of
significant potential benefits for clients through the integration of legal advice,
the opportunity to develop deeper, more supportive solicitor-client relation-
ships, and the opportunity to work jointly with other counsel to facilitate and
preserve respectful communication on the part of both parties. However, as
with screening, these potential benefits are also subject to limitations, such as
insensitivity to the existence of power differentials and their implications for the
bargaining process, formal rules discouraging lawyers from providing legal ad-
vice at appropriate stages of the process, and limited skill sets in dealing with
problems of abuse.
B. DISCLOSURE, GOOD FAITH BARGAINING, AND LIMITS ON COMMUNICATION
In addition to the extent to which it integrates lawyers into the problem-solving
process, CL differs from mediation in its allegiance to particular rules of en-
Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds., Practicing TherapeuticJurisprudence: Law as
a Helping Profession (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2000) 357 at 380-81.
121. The stronger party's lawyer can, for example, reproach his own client for put-downs or can
present the law where the other party is prepared to accept less than her legal entitlement.
122. See e.g. Julia's account from the CL study in Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9 at 173-74.
123. Ibid.
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gagement-its "choreography."1" Both mediation and CL agreements include a
range of commitments that require the parties to negotiate with openness, co-
operation, integrity, and in good faith. Since lawyers are signatories to the CL
agreement and are, relative to mediation, more actively involved in the process,
these commitments can come to life in a more meaningful way in CL. Whereas
the mediation process is flexible and is designed in accordance with the guidance
and preferences of the mediator,125 the CL process imposes unique procedural
norms and limitations on communications between lawyers and clients.
First, CL lawyers are active participants in the commitments to full disclo-
sure of all relevant information and rectification of any mistakes,1 26 and they
must typically withdraw from the process if they know such commitments are
not being fulfilled. 12 In mediation, only the parties themselves agree to disclo-
sure and lawyers are not usually witness to the exchange of information.
Through the lawyers' contractual commitments and their ability to monitor
disclosure, the promise of openness can be enforced more consistently in CL
than in mediation.
Nonetheless, CL lawyers, like mediators, must ultimately depend on their
clients' veracity and good faith and on assumptions that may be ill-founded. 28
124. Sherri Goren Slovin, "The Basics of Collaborative Family Law: A Divorce Paradigm Shift"
(2004) 18 Am. J. Fam. L. 74 at 76.
125. For a discussion of the wide range of theories and skills commonly employed by mediators,
see George W. Adams, Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute Negotiations (Toronto: CCH
Canadian, 2003) at c. 5; Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies
fir Resolving Conflicts, 2d ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); and C. Menkel-Meadow,
"The Many Ways of Mediation" (1995) 11 Negotiation J. 217.
126. In the Saskatchewan contract involving children, for example, participants agree in Article
3.1 to "give complete, honest and open disclosure of all information whether requested or
not." Saskatchewan Contract, supra note 58. The Vancouver Agreement included in
Degoldi's study requires disclosure of "all necessary and reasonable information requested."
Degoldi, supra note 65 at 176.
127. Statutory provisions or professional codes of conduct may also mandate full and accurate
disclosure of relevant and material information. See e.g. Family Law Act, R-S.O. 1990, c. F-3,
s. 56(4 )(a). Shortly before going to print, the Supreme Court of Canada determined in Rick
v. Brandsema, [2009] S.C.J. No. 10 (QL) that a husband's failure to disclose all of his assets
can render a separation agreement unconscionable at common law, even in the presence of
professional legal advice, depending on the extent of the misinformation, the nature of the
omission, and the degree of variance from the goals of the relevant legislation.
128. Degoldi, supra note 65 at 116. Macfarlane also notes concerns with the scope of some
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While any setdement may be explicidy premised on full disclosure, redress for
the failure to disclose will also generally require court action. Clients may re-
quest that statements making full and final disclosure be sworn; however, not
all lawyers use or recommend sworn statements.12' Whether such assumptions
of honesty are warranted is questionable and, in part, depends on whether law-
yers have adequately screened for basic levels of trust, prior levels of financial
disclosure, and the particular dynamics of the parties' relationship.
The CL process imposes additional constraints through the inclusion of a
DP that prohibits lawyers from acting for their clients in any contested court
proceeding.130 Unless clients specifically agree in advance to formal discovery
procedures, they give up their right to access formal discovery procedures dur-
ing CL. As well, where a client takes "unfair advantage" of the process by non-
disclosure or bad faith bargaining to the knowledge of his or her lawyer, the
lawyer must withdraw, bringing the CL process to an end.3 In effect, the party
acting in bad faith is able to force the discharge of the other party's lawyer, in-
creasing the costs for that party. 32
provisions in terms of client privacy and safety. See Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra
note 5 at 48.
129. One lawyer in Degoldi's study exchanged statements in only 60 per cent of cases and these
statements were usually not sworn. Others created Tables of Assets in open sessions. One
lawyer went for "disclosure to the satisfaction of the parties." See Degoldi, ibid at 116. Two
lawyers felt that requests for sworn statements should not be made as they were "very
positional and it entrench [ed] distrust" (at 117). The Vancouver Agreement calls for the
provision of sworn statements if requested (at 176), whereas the Saskatchewan Contract does
not address the issue.
130. See text accompanying infra notes 138-72.
131. See Saskatchewan Contract, supra note 58, art. 11.1. For a similar provision, see art. 13 of
the Vancouver Agreement in Degoldi, supra note 65 at 178.
132. See e.g. Campbell supra note 92. In this case, the collaborative process collapsed because the
husband had failed to provide adequate disclosure, a problem that persisted into the
litigation arena. It is not clear from the decision whether the parties had thereafter changed
lawyers. Depending on the language of the agreement, one might argue that the husband
should not be able to insist on the disqualification of his wife's counsel where he himself had
breached the agreement by failing to provide disclosure or to negotiate in good faith. This
may constitute a breach that releases the wife and her counsel from their contractual
obligations. One might also argue that the husband should be responsible in damages for the
increased costs incurred by the wife in hiring other counsel. An extensive analysis of the
contractual framework for the Participation Agreement is beyond the scope of this article, as
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The requirement that information exchange and negotiation occur primarily
in four-way open sessions with both lawyers and clients... can also be of mixed
benefit to clients affected by power imbalances. Four-way meetings are intended
to help achieve openness and transparency, and avoid the strategic positioning
or tactical maneuvering that can accompany traditional advocacy. Collaborative
law proponents believe that these goals are more easily achieved if "all important
conversations are ... experienced directly by each partidpant."1" Lawyers and
clients are encouraged to debrief between CL sessions,13 but according to some
agreements, full discussion of the substantive issues and exchange of information
about the law should occur only in the four-way and not in private lawyer-client
meetings. These explicit constraints represent a significant change from both
lawyer-led negotiations, where most communication would occur in two-way
meetings between the lawyer and client and be subject to solicitor-client privi-
lege, with follow up negotiation between the two lawyers-and from family
mediation, where most mediators would ask the parties to seek information
about their legal rights and obligations outside of the sessions.
This emphasis on four-way communication can negatively affect spouses
in abusive situations by discouraging lawyers from caucusing separately with
their clients and fully discussing the matters in dispute. Private dialogue be-
tween lawyer and client may often be necessary to effectively manage the
process, to ensure that the client fully understands his or her legal position, and
to support his or her participation in the process. Providing information or
advice privately is not per se being adversarial or positional. Where there are
power imbalances and, particularly, patterns of control and abuse, open disclo-
sure of concerns to the other party can in some circumstances impede the
recovery process, undermine the client's coping strategies, or even put her in
is an extensive analysis of the ethical issues surrounding privilege, confidentiality, and
conflict of interest that CL raises.
133. See Tesler, supra note 7 at 78.
134. Ibid.
135. Shields, Ryan & Smith, supra note 6 at 291, 299.
136. Saskatchewan Contract, supra note 58, art. 4.6. The Vancouver Agreement does not contain
a similar provision. See Shields, Ryan and Smith, ibiai at 147, where the authors suggest
caucuses for certain purposes but caution that they should be used "sparingly." See also
Connie den Hollander, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm ofAdvocacy (Saskatoon:
Collaborative Lawyers of Saskatchewan, 2003) at 9.
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danger. While separate caucusing with the client may produce tension, under
abusive or unequal conditions it may in fact work to advance the goals of open-
ness and transparency. In our exploratory study, the four clients dealing with
abuse or power imbalances all indicated a need for more intensive management
and support beyond the four-way meetings.13
Thus, while the CL structure may encourage more open and transparent
communication between the parties, it can also disadvantage parties in unequal
or abusive relationships. An undue emphasis on the four-way model as a pri-
mary mode of negotiation can restrict access to the verification tools of the
discovery process, and restrict the advice and independent support for vulner-
able clients. Where an abusive party bargains in bad faith or does not fully
disclose, the DP will operate to penalize the innocent spouse through the loss of
his or her counsel.
C. DISQUALIFICATION PROVISION (DP)
The DP is the key distinguishing feature in CL, and many lawyers138 view it as
essential. 3' Most CL agreements require the parties not to threaten or com-
mence court action during the process and to compromise if necessary to reach
a settlement. The DP further provides that contracting lawyers are disqualified
from representing their clients in any contested court proceeding involving the
parties.4M This clause is broad enough to be triggered by a number of events
leading to court action, including the failure to reach an agreement; the need
for a restraining order to protect a client; the reliance on formal discovery
methods in order to obtain full disclosure; or the need for an order to prohibit
137. Some also suggested that communication between dients themselves should be restricted-
an expectation that, although endorsed by contract was often violated. See e.g. Saskatchewan
Contract, supra note 58, art. 4.6.
138. See e.g. Degoldi, supra note 65 at 108, 112. One Vancouver lawyer questioned the wisdom
of such a provision "at a time where trust was at an all time low."
139. Lawyers interviewed in our study generally supported this view, but most also revealed that
they had used the process without this provision. See Lande, supra note 5 at 1324. See also
Macfarlane, "Experiences," supra note 5.
140. See art. 10 in the Vancouver Agreement in Degoldi, supra note 65 at 177. See also
Saskatchewan Contract, supra note 58, art. 13.2, 13.3, for the comparable provision. In
Saskatchewan, if either dient goes to court, both lawyers are disqualified as witnesses or from
representing either party.
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the disposition of family property, to compel enforcement after reaching a set-
dement, or to vary the terms of the initial agreement.4 1
Under the Saskatchewan Contract, CL lawyers are also bound not to release
any portion of their file or discuss any aspect of the case with a new lawyer,
unless both clients jointly agree in writing. In most agreements, related provisions
prevent the work or testimony of any experts or collaborative professionals, such
as divorce coaches or child or financial specialists, from being used or subpoenaed
in any court action without the written consent of both parties.
1 2
Most negotiation models presume and rely on access to litigation to both
frame and measure progress through the negotiation.4 In mediation, the op-
tion to terminate at any point is used as security for genuine and voluntary
participation and as a defensive "out" for those who experience the process as
coercive.1" While all costly processes likely involve some element of entrapment
over time, 5 the DP in CL deliberately increases the potential level of entrap-
ment in an effort to raise the stakes that both lawyers and clients have in the
process.1 6 The underlying behavioural assumption is that increasing the costs of
defection will reduce the temptation to become adversarial or to otherwise take
advantage of the other side. The CL model encourages early settlement by re-
moving uncertainty over the durability and strength of the parties' commitment
to cooperation that often accompanies collaborative negotiation.47
141. One can opt into CL from litigation by undertaking not to proceed or by filing a joint
petition. See Cameron, supra note 28 at 152. In some provinces, limitation periods or
valuation dates in family property legislation may require court applications to preserve
future rights. See e.g. G.M.(1) v. G.M.(2), [2005] B.C.W.L.D. 951 (S.C.); Sumners v.
Sumners, [2004] S.J. No. 450 (Sask. QB.).
142. See e.g. Vancouver Agreement, art. 14. A.2, in Degoldi, supra note 65 at 178; Saskatchewan
Contract, supra note 58, art. 13.4.
143. See Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra note 30 at c. 111, 6. The authors' early conceptualization of the
interest-based model encouraged negotiators to use knowledge of, and access to, their "best
and worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement" (which would include litigation) as a way
to increase investment in the process and to secure wise and durable agreements.
144. The Ontario Association for Family Mediation's Policy on Abuse affirms that "the issue of
voluntariness is critical when it comes to creating a safe place for couples to meet and
negotiate." Landau, Wolfson & Landau, supra note 7 at 446.
145. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5 at 60.
146. James ICL. Lawrence, "Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict
Resolution" (2002) 17 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 431 at 432-34.
147. For a discussion of the prisoner's dilemma problem, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
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There is significant academic controversy in the United States as to
whether the DP is consistent with ethical rules of professional conduct." 8 Nine
state ethics committees have considered collaborative agreements in relation to
their professional codes of conduct and all but one have upheld their use.1 '
Three states have passed statutes authorizing the use of CL. Although DPs
might be seen as analogous to agreements allowing for the withdrawal of one's
hawyer-and which are enforceable in Canada1 5 -there is a key difference in
that the loss of one's lawyer under the DP can be triggered by the conduct of
either party, and not only the lawyer's own client. Some writers have argued
that parties might be better served by a different process, especially where the
parties' economic resources and the merits of their legal positions differ signifi-
cantly."' An alternative process is Co-operative Law, which includes a Co-
operative Agreement that incorporates the co-operative norms of CL but ex-
cludes the DP. 52 According to Hilary Linton, in circumstances of financial and
legal inequality, the DP will unfairly compromise the power of the party with
the superior legal claim and deny a legitimate source of leverage. 53
Although the DP is gender neutral in form, it is likely to have a disparate
impact on female clients and place them at greater risk of relative disadvantage.
Since women are most often the claimants in family disputes, legal entitlements
are more apt to operate as a source of power for them." Upon separation, it is
Mnookin, "Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in
Litigation" (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509. See generally Yarn, supra note 69; Macfarlane,
"Experiences," supra note 5 at 186.
148. Lande, supra note 5.
149. See IACP Ethics Task Force, "The Ethics of the Collaborative Participation Agreement: A
Critique of Colorado's Maverick Ethics Opinion" (2007) 9 Collaborative Rev. 8 at 8. The
American Bar Association recently found that the DP did not create an inherent conflict of
interest for practitioners, provided ldients were flly itxformed regarding the provisions. See
Eileen Libby, "Putting a Kinder Face on Litigation: ABA Opinion Gives Collaborative Law
Practice an Ethics Thumbs-up" (2008) 94 A.B.A. J. 22 at 22.
150. See Lande, supra note 5 at 1348 and his discussion of Boughton Peterson YangAnderson v.
Elliott, [1999] 6 W.W.R 619 (B.C.S.C.).
151. Hilary A. Linton, "Collaborative Law: Thinking About the Alternatives" (2008) 311 Can.
Fam. L. Matters 1.
152. For example, Lande and Herman suggest that in cases of deliberate stalling, one might need
to threaten litigation to move on. See Lande & Herman, supra note 63 at 286-87.
153. Ibid at 5.
154. Note, however, that the degree of this power will depend on the strength of the legal claim
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women who more often lack access to an adequate income stream or marital
assets or who may have superior claims to custody through their disproportion-
ate role as primary caregivers."' 5 To the extent that the DP raises the financial
and emotional costs of litigation, it can increase the pressure to accept agreements
that meet neither womens' identified interests nor their legal entitlements.
Because both parties must share the eventual cost of litigation, the risk of
being undermined in this way is most significant where trust is lacking, eco-
nomic resources are unequal, and clients are affected by abusive and controlling
dynamics. By increasing the cost of litigation as an alternative, the DP affords
one more lever for manipulation and control.156 Unequal, abusive, and control-
ling dynamics can also have a far more negative emotional impact where clients
have high expectations and are encouraged to engage, from the outset, in co-
operative rather than adversarial negotiation."' 7
The commitment to settlement in CL may also impede a lawyer's ability to
advise his or her client to withdraw in a timely way. In mediation, withdrawal
from the process is the ultimate response to abuse. CL increases the costs of
withdrawal for both lawyers and clients, and can thereby complicate the ability
to monitor power dynamics throughout the process. Moreover, if an abused
client's safety is threatened during the course of negotiations, he or she may be
unable to obtain a restraining order without simultaneously losing the services
of his or her lawyer.
There is, to date, little empirical research analyzing the impact of DPs on
clients. In our small exploratory study, clients all knew about the DP, although
they may not have fully understood the potential consequences of the clause."58
Interviews did, however, reveal the potential for harm. One client's story sug-
and the predictability of the outcome and on the client's economic ability to advance
litigation. See Martin, supra note 21.
155. Linton, supra note 151 (using the example of a primary caregiver in a custody dispute to
make her point-although in some jurisdictions, primary caregiving may not clearly provide
a superior claim to sole custody).
156. See e.g. Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra note 27; Goundry, supra note 27. We recognize that
recourse to litigation can also be used as an abusive tactic in some circumstances.
157. See Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, supra note 9 at 189 (citing Jane's comment that: "I think I
would have had my guard up higher if I knew it was going to be so polarized"). See also
Lande, supra note 5 at 1367.
158. See Keet, Wiegers & Morrison, ibid.
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gested that her husband had used the process as one more arena for manipula-
tion and control in what had been a long-term abusive relationship. 5' Although
he eventually signed an agreement, he did not comply with it, and she was
forced to obtain another lawyer for the purpose of enforcement. Three other
clients who also identified themselves as abused or weaker in bargaining power
worried about the potential loss of their lawyers if the other party failed to ne-
gotiate or settle. The loss of counsel was perceived not only as an added
financial cost but also a loss of critical emotional support, particularly where the
dynamics between the parties were subtle. Two of the twelve lawyers inter-
viewed in our study further noted the potential for one client to abuse the
process for his or her own benefit, for example, through deliberate delay.
160
The significant risks of DP underscore the importance of appropriate
screening mechanisms and raise questions as to whether the DP is really neces-
sary to achieve its ostensible purposes. Unlike the lawyers, most of the clients
interviewed in our study did not view the DP as essential, and many were con-
fused about its rationale. Given the concerns clients have consistently expressed
about the cost of litigation and the cost of legal representation in CL, 6 ' cost
alone could reasonably motivate a commitment to settle and avoid litigation in
most cases.
While the DP may occasionally be useful in controlling an angry, impul-
sive client,1 62 one of the clients we interviewed suggested that the DP was more
about keeping the lawyers' boundaries clear rather than working in the best
interests of clients. Lawyers frequently noted the difficulty they had in trying to
remain interest-based and avoiding the temptation to fall back into an adversar-
159. For Julia's account and related discussion, see ibid at 163, 173-74.
160. UM2 and 1U2. UM2 stated: "I have definitely had clients that have used the process to try
and present a sweet face and drag things out to the detriment of the other party." Another
lawyer described how the CL process collapsed when the husband discovered that he could
not control his wife through the process.
161. See e.g. Macfarlane, Emerging Phenomenon, supra note 5.
162. Admittedly, if one party refuses to sign onto the DP, the other may be highly suspicious and
refuse to negotiate- In this sense, the prominence of the DP can set the stage for distrust if
there is no immediate buy-in. However, many lawyers do appear to be using the CL process
informally, without the DP. Moreover, concerns about the DP may signal a screening issue
and raise questions as to whether there is sufficient trust between the parties for the process
to be successful.
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ial, positional mindset. 163 According to one lawyer, you cannot give yourself
"any other way of thinking."1" A very tight set of commitments to counteract
the pull of litigation may help to prevent genuine attempts at collaboration
from being undermined. However, in the face of the risks arising from signifi-
cant power imbalances, including additional costs and the loss of one's choice
of counsel, this blanket justification for the DP is not enough.
The withdrawal of lawyers has also been described as "important to pre-
serve the confidentiality and integrity of the collaborative process."1 6 CL
contracts, as in mediation, typically provide that disclosures made by either
party, either lawyer, or any consultants during the process cannot be used in
any court process and that all communications are confidential and without
prejudice.1 66 Such provisions flow in part from the privileged nature of settle-
ment negotiations generally. 6 Their technical purpose is to ensure that
concessions made during the negotiation process cannot be used in later litiga-
tion, either as admissions or to establish facts, but they are limited in scope.
Such clauses cannot protect against the use of objective evidence disclosed dur-
ing the process, which may have been previously unknown but cannot be
proven through other means. Although there is also some question about the
163. UF 1, UF2. Research on the impact of court-connected mediation programs confirms the
degree to which adversarial norms have continued to pervade the mediation process. See
Michaela Keet, "The Evolution of Lawyers' Roles in Mandatory Mediation: A Condition
of Systemic Transformation" (2005) 68 Sask. L. Rev. 313; Julie Macfarlane, "Culture
Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation" (2002) J. Disp.
Resol. 241.
164. UF3. The DP has been seen as useful in avoiding an escalating spiral of retaliatory responses
that may begin with misperceptions and be otherwise difficult to stop. See Lande, supra note
5 at 1380.
165. Collaborative Lawyers of Saskatchewan, Brochure, "Collaborative Law," online:
<http://www.collabsaskcom/documents/collaborative-law.pdf>.
166. Saskatchewan Contract, supra note 58, Arts. 4.5, 13.6. Note that interim agreements reached
during the CL process have been admitted into evidence in subsequent litigation. See e.g Fox
v. Fox (2007), 319 N.B.R. (2d) 97 (Q.B.); Froese v. Froese (2005), 138 A.C.W.S. (3d) 521
(Man. QB.) (promise by H to pay legal costs of CL); and Clavelle v. Clavel/e (2004), 130
A.C.W.S. (3d) 1148 (Sask. QB.). According to the Saskatchewan Contract, art. 12.1, in-
terim agreements are not binding on the parties unless reduced to writing and signed by both
clients and lawyers.
167. Legislative confidentiality protections may also apply. See e.g The Family Maintenance Act,
1997, S.S. 1997, c. F-6.2, s. 15(3).
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extent to which courts actually enforce confidentiality provisions, 168 these limi-
tations affect the exchange of information in all collaborative negotiations,
1 6'
and they are not avoided in any meaningful way by the DP.
The DP may provide a marginal advantage in that the lawyer who has wit-
nessed the information exchange is typically not the same lawyer who will be
advancing the case through litigation. This advantage would generally, how-
ever, be outweighed by the reality that almost all information potentially
disclosed during a negotiation would also be "discoverable" during the exami-
nation and exchange of documents in litigation, with the significant exception
of strong client preferences or priorities.7 Concerns over the strategic use of
these types of disclosure are not fully addressed by the DP because the clients
themselves remain free to disclose this information to successive counsel. The
significant risks posed by the DP in relation to its benefits raise questions as to
why such a provision would be invoked and why its use would be concentrated
in family law-an area where instances of abuse and power imbalances are rela-
tively high.
171
168. Some courts have made fine distinctions in admitting such evidence. See e.g Re Springdale
Farms Ltd (1991), 79 D.LR. (4th) 88 (Sask. C.A.); Sharp v. Edsam Holdings Ltd (1999),
176 Sask. R. 248 (Q.B.) at paras. 15-2 1.
169. W.B. Leahy & ICE. Rubin, "Keeping the 'R' in ADR. How Olam Treats Confidentiality"
(1999) 17 Alt. J. 187; R.A. Baruch Bush, "Mediator's Dilemma: The Legal Requirements
Exception to Confidentiality under the Texas ADR Statute" (1995) 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 579;
V. Vann, "Confidentiality in Court-Sponsored Mediation: Disdose at Your Own Risk?"
(1999) 10 Ausd. Disp. Resol. J. 195; O.V. Gray, "Protecting the Confidentiality of
Communication in Mediation" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 667; and Jonnette Watson-
Hamilton, "Protecting Confidentiality in Mandatory Mediation: Lessons from Ontario and
Saskatchewan" (1998-1999) 24 Queen's L.J. 561. No one has argued that lawyers attending
mediation sessions or involved in co-operative proceedings should be barred from subsequent
litigation on grounds of confidentiality.
170. Lande, supra note 5 at 1342 (noting that the potential for CL negotiations to require
disdosure about "personal concerns" or "settlement fcts" may not normally be discoverable
at the examinations stages). For a discussion of the differences in the nature of information
which may arise in interest-based processes as opposed to litigation, see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, "Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the
Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities" (1997) 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 407 at 423.
171. See Lande, ibid. at 1316 (identifying factors that might have led to CL's concentration in
family law, such as the tendency for family law cases to be one-shot occasions and to involve
more practitioners, less polarized fields, and more darity about legal standards and
outcomes-not all of which are convincing). Lande also notes that business people are wary
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Effective management of the risks posed by the DP would entail full and
detailed explanations of the varied concerns; conscientious screening, including
a presumption against the DP that might force lawyers to attend more scrupu-
lously to this task; active monitoring; and early termination of the process to
minimize costs upon withdrawal. Lawyers should consider variations or alterna-
tives to the CL process, such as Co-operative Law, which retains the interest-
based framework but allows litigation.1 2 Macfarlane's suggestion of an agreed
time-limited period of negotiation before litigation would help keep lawyers'
boundaries dearer, but it would not on its own assist in managing abuse within
the sessions. Collaborative contracts could also be revised to provide explicitly
for remedies that might deter opportunistic behaviour, including a right to in-
creased legal costs or release from the DP in cases of bad faith bargaining.
III. CONCLUSION
Access to justice has been identified as a key concern in family law.1" The fu-
ture significance of collaborative family law for women will depend on the
extent to which it addresses existing barriers to access to justice, including its
accessibility and cost-effectiveness, and its response to underlying inequalities in
the bargaining process. The intense involvement of legal advocates in CL pro-
vides an opportunity not only to enhance the problem-solving experience for
women in the family law system but also to contribute, through a re-
socialization of lawyers, to more lasting systemic change. CL has given lawyers,
both male and female, permission to talk about negative aspects of the image of
of CL and the DP (at 1318), citing John Lande, "Evading Evasion: How Protocols Can
Improve Civil Case Results" (2003) 21 Alt. to High Cost Litig. 149 at 163-65. See contra
David Hoffman, "Collaborative Law in the World of Business" (2004) 6 The Collaborative
Rev. 1. Some literature also suggests that family law clients are susceptible to pressures and
direction from their lawyers, likely due in part to emotional stress. See e.g. Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lauyers and Their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal
Process (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
172. See e.g Lande & Herman, supra note 63 at 284. It is recommended that Co-operative Law
be used where either the threat is needed to motivate settlement or where, according to
Lande and Herman: "[t]here may be a significant risk that one party would take advantage of
another" (at 187).
173. See Addario, supra note 3. See also Michael Trebilcock, Report of the LegalAid Review 2008
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, 2008), online: <http://www.
attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.calenglish/about/pubs/> at 54-55, 109.
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the litigious lawyer.17 Although many such accounts still rely on "simplistic
dichotomous images" and a "generic horror story," 5 the obvious passion,
commitment, and "ethic of care" 6 that many CL lawyers bring to their work
highlight what may be too often missing in the adversarial system. In this sense,
the turn to CL from mediation is more than an appropriation of similar rheto-
ric or a power grab in a professional turf war.
CL could ultimately do more than mediation to change the legal culture.1"
Although mediation has been institutionalized to a greater degree and extended
to other areas of law, its impact has been limited by the peripheral and uncer-
tain role lawyers have played in its development. The excitement that many
lawyers have for CL likely flows precisely from the discovery of a "functional
role model" within an alternative dispute resolution process-accompanied by
a new, still rule-oriented, procedural structure and ethical framework. The fact
that many lawyers practising CL continue to include litigation in their family
practice also suggests that rather than polarizing the practice of family law, the
co-operative norms and values of CL may "spill over" into traditional negotia-
tions and litigation.
CL may also have a unique capacity to raise lawyers' sensitivity to power
differentials through the organizational structures the movement has spawned
among practising lawyers. Whereas mediation practice groups and policy de-
bates tend to exclude lawyers who are not also professional mediators, CL can
draw on professional associations and community groups that have formed
across the country to provide information to the public as well as training and
174. Many lawyers cite reasons, induding their own mental, physical, and emotional health, as
motivations for turning to CL. Lawyers in our study, for example, identified reduced levels
of anxiety (RF2), stress (UM3), animosity (RM2), confrontation (UM2), and dient bashing
(RM2) as -advantages that would increase their enjoyment of their work. Such reasns are
commonly offered as motives for the use of CL.
175. Fineman, supra note 43 at 754, 756. Lawyers in our research somewhat predictably described
the adversarial system in highly negative and aggressive language but empirical research suggests
that family lawyers desire and strongly encourage settlement. See e.g. Hunter, "Future," supra
note 5; Lande, supra note 5 at 1334; and Neilson, SpousalAbuse, supra note 27 at iii.
176. Carla Hotel & Joan Brockman, "The Conciliatory-Adversarial Continuum in Family Law
Practice" (1994) 12 Can. J. Fam. L. 11 at 20-21.
177. See Julie Macfarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transfirming the Practice of Law
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) (documenting and encouraging the development of a new
model of legal advocacy).
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support for lawyers. 8 Through training and collective discussion, these groups
have the potential to increase sensitivities and work through new approaches.
Under current social conditions, the fundamental conflict of interest be-
tween the men and women who ultimately finance the provision of CL will
inevitably limit the extent of this influence. Gendered inequalities are also diffi-
cult issues for a movement still struggling for legitimacy in a conservative
profession to confront, particularly in times of political reaction and resistance
to feminist discourse and initiatives.1 ' However, heightened attention to the
existence of gendered power differentials, the exploration of variations in the
"meaning of cooperation" by screening clients into different processes,1 80 timely
and specific legal advice, and deeper and more effective lawyer-client communi-
cation could provide meaningful ways of improving the experience of female
clients in the family law justice system. While not a radical challenge to sys-
temic inequality, the adoption of such measures could at least mitigate the
damage that can otherwise result when power differentials are obscured for the
sake of family harmony.
178. Collaborative lawyers tend to express support for advanced training. See Degoldi, supra note
65 at 163. There was also evidence of this in our lawyer interviews.
179. See Dorothy E Chunn, Susan B. Boyd & Hester Lessard, eds., Reaction and Resistance:
Feminism, Law, and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
180. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 147 at 563. See also Lande & Herman, supra note 63.
